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Abstract:
Following the rural reform in 1978 a series of agricultural reforms were introduced in China
with an aim to create incentives for the farmers to produce more. The ninetiesprice reform that
was aimed at deregulating the agricultural market eventually resulted in a huge drop in agricultural
production; this apparently motivated the government to take over the control of agricultural prices
in 1998. For a dataset that covers all the major rural reforms undertaken in China, we examine how
and to what extent these reforms a¤ected the productivity and welfare of wheat farmers in China.
We nd that the ninetiesprice reforms resulted in a high magnitude of e¤ort-response from wheat
farmers which led to a faster growth of the incentive component of productivity. Due to random
weather shocks this response did not result in the expected level of prot and as a result the farmers
su¤ered a decline in welfare. The regulations introduced in 1998 destroyed the incentive-induced
growth in TFP. In general wheat farmers in China responded highly when markets were made more
competitive, and their e¤ort-response for at subsidies (e.g. the ones introduced in the eighties) was
very marginal.
JEL Codes: N55, O13, O53, Q12.
Keywords: China, Incentives, TFP, Agriculture, Wheat Production.
1Corresponding author. Cardi¤Business School, Aberconway, Colum Drive, CF10 3EU, United Kingdom;
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1 Introduction
Since 1978 a series of agricultural policy reforms were gradually introduced in China in
order to shift the agricultural commune system towards a more liberalized agricultural
market system. These reforms were mainly aimed at achieving a higher level of aggregate
production of major foodgrains and a higher level of productivity of farmers. According to
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 2008 data, China is one of the largest
producers of wheat in the world accounting for approximately 17% of the worlds wheat
production2. In this paper we examine if, how and to what extent the incentives introduced
through the policy reforms during the period 1978-2007 contributed to the growth in wheat
production, to the growth in farmersproductivity, and to farmerswelfare in China.
This paper is important for three reasons. First, in this paper we examine how farmers in
China react to reforms, where reforms are directed towards providing farmers the incentive
to produce and sell wheat more competitively. Based on an analytical framework where
we assume that the farmers are prot-maximizers and they choose the e¤ort level that is
optimal, we empirically examine the farmerse¤ort-response for the full set of agricultural
reforms undertaken in China. We explore this framework in order to study how prot
maximizing farmers respond to changes in policy and institutions. Second, we examine how
reforms a¤ect the growth in the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) of wheat production3 and
the growth in the incentive component of this TFP for a country that has experienced a series
of interesting reforms and weather shocks and currently is one of the largest producers of
wheat. In doing so we use the most recent available dataset which covers almost a decade
following the last important reforms. In this way our study extends important previous
studies, such as Zhang and Carter (1997), Lin (1992), and McMillan et al. (1989)4.
We also extend these works (and others, such as Che et al., 2001, Kompas, 2005 and
Selim and Parvin, 2010) by simulating the e¤ect of policy reforms on the welfare of farm-
ers. Through the welfare analysis, we examine if and to what extent policy reforms have
contributed to the improvement of living for the wheat farmers in China, which is the third
important contribution of this paper.
2 India, USA and the European Union are the other largest producers of wheat, see USDA Wheat database
for details.
3 If wheat production function is Q = Af (X1; X2; ::::; Xn), where Q denotes total output of wheat,
Xis; i = 1; 2; ::::; n denote the quantities of n inputs used in producing Q, Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
of wheat production, denoted by A, is the portion of wheat output not explained by the amounts of inputs
used in production. As such, its level is determined by how e¢ ciently and intensely the inputs are utilized
in wheat production.
4None of these studies consider the most recent important agricultural reform in China that was intro-
duced in 1998. In this paper we consider a dataset which is for 1978-2007, i.e. a dataset that covers all the
major agricultural reforms in China.
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We follow the approach as in Hayami and Ruttan (1985), which McMillan et al. (1989),
Lin (1992) and Zhang and Carter (1997) explore to study foodgrain productivity growth in
China for 1978-84, 1970-87 and 1979-86, respectively5. Typically in economies in transition
factor price and product price increase at di¤erent rates with market reforms. We charac-
terize this process through a weighted cost-share parameter of wheat production in China,
which is the ratio of average factor to product prices. As is true for most economies in tran-
sition, the value of such a cost-share parameter falls over time with market reforms which
in turns results in higher prots. We assume that farmers are prot maximizers, therefore
they will choose e¤ort levels that are optimal. We use the farmersoptimal e¤ort function
in order to transform a technical wheat production function into a production function that
captures the farmersoptimal response to changes in institutions and policy. We estimate
the transformed function using panel data of 30 wheat producing regions of China for the
period 1997-2006.
We use the estimated factor share parameters, other parameters of the model, and time
series of aggregate level data of factor and wheat prices for China for the period 1978-2007
in order to simulate the time path of TFP and the time path of its incentive component.
This enables us to capture the TFP growth and the growth in the incentive component of
this TFP for all policy regimes. In addition, we use the computed parameters to generate a
utility index and a time path of optimal e¤ort levels for the entire reform period. Typically,
the incentives that are introduced through the reforms result in higher level of e¤ort, which
in turns adds to the disutility of wheat farmers. But since farmers like prots, the increase
in prot (resulting from the higher level of e¤ort) adds to the utility of wheat farmers. The
utility level resulting from a particular reform (or a series of reforms) would therefore depend
on which e¤ect dominates. We compute the utility index for the entire reform period which
enables us to examine how policy reforms a¤ected the welfare of wheat farmers in China.
We nd that compared to the incentives introduced through the rural reforms in the
early eighties, the incentives introduced through the price reforms of the nineties accounted
for a greater response from wheat farmers. This response led to higher e¤ort levels in
the nineties. However, presumably due to the series of droughts in the early nineties the
extended e¤orts did not result in higher prots in wheat production, which is possibly why
we nd that during this phase the farmers su¤ered a large drop in welfare. We nd a further
drop in welfare of farmers following the most recent reform of 1998 when the government
took over the control of agricultural prices. Our results also suggest that wheat production
5Che et al. (2001) and Che et al. (2006) use a similar approach to examine the productivity in rice
cultivation in Vietnam, and Selim and Parvin (2010) follow a similar approach to examine the extent of rice
farmersresponse to incentives in Bangladesh.
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in China experienced an increase in TFP immediately following the early stages of reforms,
and the main channel of this growth was the incentive component of TFP. By taking over the
control of prices in 1998, the government destroyed the growth in the incentive component
of TFP. In general we nd that wheat farmers in China responded positively to reforms
that led to more competitive market structure, and their e¤ort-response to the introduction
of at subsidies or regulated pricing was very little.
2 A Brief History of Chinese Agricultural Reforms
We consult four main sources, namely, the various publications of the Ministry of Agriculture
of the Peoples Republic of China (MOA, hereafter), Harrold (1992), Carter (2003) and Tong
et al. (2003) in summarizing the major agricultural policy reforms that were undertaken in
China. In 1976 when the communist leader Mao passed away, the new leadership led China
into a period of great economic reforms starting with the rural reforms. The rural reforms
began by changing the agricultural production system from the commune system to one of
the household contract responsibility system in 1978. Under this new system the farmers
were given a long term lease on the land that they farmed and instead of transferring all
their produce to the government they were allowed to keep some and sell it at market prices
to make a prot.
The government apparently recognised the need for specialization and the notion of
absolute advantage and realized that it would be more e¢ cient to allocate certain crops to
specic provinces. Harrold (1992) nds that this reform led to a 25% (average) real increase
in relative agricultural prices, which in turns acted as an incentive to produce more6. The
state monopoly of allocating agricultural land was abolished so that the farmers could set
up diversied businesses such as township enterprises. These reforms allowed a greater
freedom for the farmers which resulted in their attempt to take advantage of the incentives
to produce more with a greater level of e¢ ciency.
As a support towards the rst step of liberalization, in 1984 the government introduced
an increase in price subsidy. In the following year the government left its role as the state
monopoly of agricultural trade and established a market based contract structure. In 1986
the government introduced a scheme of increased subsidies to cereal production. During this
regime there was also an increase in the chemical fertiliser supply, resulting in an increase
in aggregate production levels of crops (see Tong et al., 2003 for details).
6Halbrendt and Gempesaw (1990) and Sicular (1988) also nd that the initial stage of rural reforms in
China led to an increase in the price levels of agricultural inputs.
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The reforms in the nineties were mainly price reforms which together with the afore-
mentioned changes enabled farmers to make many decisions on their own. As the years
progressed so did the level of technology, and farmers in China started to adopt the new
technology package which enabled further diversication. Research and development into
seeds and fertilizer contributed to the increase in production. Apart from the rural reforms,
several other policy reforms such as the state owned enterprise reform, social sector reform
and the nancial sector reform undertaken in the late eighties and the early nineties were
aimed at providing a sound policy environment towards agricultural growth. The sequence
of reforms posed a need for a reform on the prices. The government undertook the two-tier
price reform in 1988 and in 1991. The rst of these reforms a¤ected the non-staple products,
while the second a¤ected the grain and the oil seed prices (see Harrold, 1992 for details).
These reforms were aimed at promoting the market based trade of agricultural inputs and
output. Prior to these reforms, the government played a major role in determining all the
prices of goods and services.
However, in 1998 the government introduced the grain self-su¢ ciency system. Through
this reform the government again took over the control of the grain prices. This move by the
government altered the incentive structure that were previously introduced. This reform
allegedly is a result of a decade of low growth in agricultural production in China, when
the growth rate in rice production and wheat production dropped from 4.89% and 7.32%
to 1.39% and 2.08%, respectively (see Pingali and Heisey, 2001 for details).
According to the reports of the MOA, the rural reforms led to development in agri-
cultural productivity, rejuvination to the rural economy, improvement in living standards,
and a sustained and rapid level of economic development. With the introduction of the
grain self-su¢ ciency system in 1998 when the government took over the control of grain
prices, the government committed to continue reforms that are aimed at improving the level
of agricultural productivity, devising a farmland protection system, promoting agricultural
structure readjustment, strengthening the agricultural service system, improving the rural
distribution system, intensifying the rural reforms and expanding and opening up China to
the rest of the world.
Apart from the policy reforms which created impacts on agricultural production and
productivity, certain environmental shocks and global political as well as economic events
are often alleged to have a¤ected agricultural production in China. The Asian nancial
crisis caused a deceleration of the Chinese economy. This crisis happened just before the
grain self-su¢ ciency system was introduced. China joined the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 2001 which enabled a greater amount of trade on the foreign market, resulting in
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a greater amount of competition in the local market (BBC 2010b). In 2003, the outbreak
of the Sars Virus forced the Chinese farmers into quarantine restrictions (BBC 2010a). The
global nancial crisis of 2009 a¤ected the major markets of the world including Chinas
major export markets. There were also a number of natural disasters such as the droughts
faced in 1991, 1992, 1994, 1997 and 2006, and the snowstorm and earthquake in 2008, which
are held partly responsible for not only the contemporaneous loss in agricultural output but
also for adverse long term e¤ects on the conditions of agricultural land and infrastructure.
In this paper we mainly focus on the hypothesis that the main reason of the changes
in agricultural productivity in China is the changes in the incentive structures that were
introduced through the policy reforms. We consider three stages of agricultural policy
reforms, namely, (1) the rural reforms 1979-1984, when agricultural markets were partly
liberalized (the partly liberalized regime), (2) the rural reforms 1985-1997, when agricultural
markets were fully liberalized (the liberalized regime), and (3) the rural reforms 1998-2007,
when the state took over the control of agricultural prices (the grain self-su¢ ciency regime).
Our empirical methodology enables us to characterize the changes in the incentive structures
that were introduced through these three regimes and their resulting impact on the TFP of
wheat production. In order to account for the incentive-induced changes in productivity we
decompose TFP of wheat production into an incentive component and an other component.
While our key focus will be on the incentive component of TFP, the other component of
TFP is assumed to account for exogenous random shock-induced changes in TFP of wheat
production.
3 The Analytical Model
We assume that the production of wheat requires four inputs: e¤ective contribution of
labour, e¤ective use of machinery power, land, and the total amount of fertilizers. Let "N
denote the level of e¤ort of a typical farmer so that in a model with N farmers, "NN is the
e¤ective contribution of farmersworking time measured in e¢ ciency units7. Since managing
the use of machinery power is a major source of concern for a typical farmer, we capture the
management of machinery power through another e¤ort variable, denoted by "M , i.e. if M
denotes the total power of the machinery used in wheat production, "M captures the e¤ort
associated with exploiting and managing the machinery power8. Measured in e¢ ciency
7The value of "N in this model is one that includes everything that determines the quality of the farmers
working time as well as the willingness of exert more e¤ort due to the enhanced incentives that accompany
agricultural reforms.
8 In this model "M is a proxy for machinery management skills of a typical farmer, but the execution of
this skill requires hard work, something which the farmers do not like.
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units, the total input of machinery power in wheat production is therefore "MM .
With a0 2 (0;1) and ai 2 [0; 1] ; i = 1; 2; 3; 4, such that
4P
i=1
ai = 1, the technical constant
returns to scale (CRTS) production function for wheat is:
Q = a0 ("NN)
a1 ("MM)
a2 (L)a3 (F )a4 (1)
where Q denotes the total output of wheat, L denotes the sown area of wheat, and F
denotes the total amount of fertilizer used in wheat production. In per capita terms, the
production function is
q = a0 ("N )
a1 ("Mm)
a2 la3fa4 (2)
Let p denote the market price of wheat, and !i; i = 1; 2; 3; 4, denote the price of input
i. Farmers choose the least cost combination of inputs. The total cost function, with  > 0
(a constant) is given by:
TC = 
Y
i
!aii Q (3)
With the average real input price  (!) =
Y
i
!aii , the cost of production per farmer is:
C =  (w) q (4)
Let   (!)p , which is the ratio of the observed average input to output prices. The
farmers prot function is:
 = pq (1  ) (5)
Farmers utility is dened over prots and the e¤ort levels. They like the prots but
dislike the e¤ort of hard work and the e¤ort of planning more e¢ cient use of the machinery
power. Their utility function is:
U (; "N ; "M ) =    
n
("N )
1
 + ("M )
1

o
(6)
with  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0;1)9. With (2) and (5), we can write the farmers utility
maximization problem as:
max
"N ;"M
U ("N ; "M ) =
h
pa0 ("N )
a1 ("Mm)
a2 la3fa4 (1  )  
n
("N )
1
 + ("M )
1

oi
(7)
9With (6), the marginal utility of prot is constant and the marginal disutility of e¤ort is increasing in
the level of e¤ort. Without loss of generality we assume that the parameter  in (6) is identical across both
types of e¤ort.
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The optimal values of e¤ort levels satisfy
("N )
1
  =
1

p (1  ) a0ma2 la3fa4a(1 a2)1 aa22 (8)
("M )
1
  =
1

p (1  !) a0ma2 la3fa4a(1 a1)2 aa11 (9)
where   11 (a1+a2) .
Proposition 1 The optimal e¤ort level in work is a xed proportion of the optimal e¤ort
level in planning the use of machinery power.
Proof. Consider (8) and (9) which together imply
"N
"M
=
"
a
(1 a2)
1 a
a2
2
aa11 a
(1 a1)
2
# 
(10)
and therefore
"N =

a1
a2

"M (11)
and the xed proportion depends on a1; a2 and .
The optimal levels of e¤ort given by (8) and (9) depend on, among others, the output
and input prices. In transition economies, prices of inputs and the price of output generally
increase at di¤erent rates with reforms. This process is characterized by the share-cost
parameter . Any change in this parameter will a¤ect the farmersoptimal e¤ort-response.
Thus any change in policy and institutions that alters the price of agricultural inputs and/or
the market price for wheat is captured by the change in the level of e¤ort by a typical farmer.
Together with the changes in output and inputs prices which alter the prots of a typical
farmer, changes in the optimal e¤ort level thus guide the change in TFP and the change in
utility.
We substitute (8) in (1) in order to derive the institutional production function, i.e.
the production function that captures farmersoptimal response to changes in market and
institutions:
Q = A (N)1 (M)2 (L)3 (F )4 (12)
where the total factor productivity (TFP) coe¢ cient A is given by:
A = (a0)
 

1

p (1  )
(a1+a2) 
(a1)
a1 (a2)
a2 (13)
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and the share parameters in (12) are
1 =  [a1    (a1 + a1)] (14a)
2 = a2 (14b)
3 = a3 (14c)
4 = a4 (14d)
for working time, machinery power, land and fertilizers, respectively. The institutional
production function (12) introduces the empirical relevance to the model. With  2 (0; 1),
and ai 2 [0; 1] ; i = 1; 2; 3; 4, such that
4P
i=1
ai = 1,  > 0 and therefore is are empirically
di¤erent from ais. In this way, we have transformed a technical production function into
an institutional production function for which the TFP coe¢ cient captures the farmers
optimal response to changes in policy and institutions. With obervable data we estimate
the institutional production function, (12).
The TFP coe¢ cient in (13) can now be decomposed into two components, which are:
Ainc = [p (1  )](a1+a2) (15)
and
Aother = (a0)
 
"
(a1)
a1 (a2)
a2

1

(a1+a2)# 
(16)
In this way, the institutional production function assists in explaining the incentive
induced growth in TFP. More specically, Ainc is the incentive component of TFP in wheat
production, i.e. the component that changes due to changes in output and input prices,
and Aother is the unexplained component of TFP, and clearly,
(Ainc) (Aother) = A (17)
As in (15) and (16), the component Aother is xed while the component Ainc varies with
the level of prots. When reforms generate incentives to produce more, farmers earn higher
prots and the term p (1  ) in (15) increases resulting in higher levels of incentive-induced
growth in TFP.
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4 Data and Estimation
In this paper we estimate (12) using panel data for thirty regions of China over the
period 1997-2006. We then use the estimated parameters and the constant returns to
scale assumption in (14) in order to pin down the values of the 5 unknowns in (14), i.e.
ai 2 [0; 1] ; i = 1; 2; 3; 4, and . Once these are pinned down, we simulate the time path of
A and Ainc using time series of national wheat production aggregates (inputs and output)
over the three regimes, i.e. for the period 1978-2007. This enables us to compare the trend
in TFP with the trend in the incentive component of TFP, and also the growth in TFP and
the growth in the incentive component of TFP of wheat production in China.
4.1 Data
Our main data source is the Economic Research Service (ERS) at the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA) that use the Statistical Yearbook published by the National
Bureau of Statistics, China (SYB, CBNS)10. Summary statistics for the panel data (regional
level) including the description of variables are presented in table 1 (in appendix A). The
time series data on wheat output and inputs used for wheat production are in gure 1a,
and the time series of input and output price indices and the computed prot index are in
gure 1b (in appendix B). The summary statistics for the time series data on inputs and
output are in table 2 (in appendix A).
The data that are available from these sources, both for the regional and the national
aggregate level, include output of wheat as the total wheat production measured on an
annual basis in 1000 tons. The total area of cultivated land and sown area for wheat are
both in 1000 hectares. Agricultural employment is in millions11. The machinery data is
the total power of agricultural machinery (in 10000 kw) used in farming, forestry, animal
husbandry, and shery, including ploughing, irrigation and drainage, harvesting, transport,
plant protection and stock breeding. Fertilizer data is the quantity of chemical fertilizer (in
10000 tons for regional data) applied in agriculture during the year, including nitrogenous
fertilizer, phosphate fertilizer, potash fertilizer, and compound fertilizer. We convert the
data in per hectare form, i.e. we rst compute the proportion of total cultivated land
that is cultivated for wheat production. We use this proportion to derive output of wheat
10The input and output data for wheat production is collected from the Department of Rural, Social and
Economic Survey. The input and output price data are collected from the Department of Urban, Social and
Economic Survey.
11This agricultural labour force refers to the total labourers who are directly engaged in farming and
receive remuneration payment or earn business income in the farming sector. For regional level data the
agricultural employment is in 10000 persons.
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per hectare, power of machinery used per hectare and chemical fertilizer used per hectare.
The labour data is taken in the form of person days per hectare. This is calculated by
multiplying the labour force by the ratio of the total sown area of wheat and the total area
of cultivated land, and then dividing the result by three hundred (the approximate number
of working days in one year).
The input price and output price data that we use are the national level averages. The
price of wheat is taken from the USDA. This price data is the producersprice index for
wheat computed using a geometric mean approach. Because farmers in China are required
to pay an agricultural tax for land use, we use the (per hectare) revenue collected from this
tax as a proxy for land rental. The wage data is the average wage of agricultural workers,
in money terms per person over one year. The price for farm machinery and the price for
chemical fertilizer are collected from Statistical Yearbook of CBNS. We collect net income
per capita which is the total income of the permanent residents of the rural households
during a year after the deduction of the expenses for productive and non-productive business
operation, the payment for taxes and the payment for collective units for their contracted
tasks. This net income data is our proxy for net prots of farmers. This data is required in
order to pin down the parameter  using (5). For the simulations we convert all price data
and the net prot data into indices with 1978 as the base year.
4.2 Estimation, diagnostic tests and computations
We estimate (12) using many combinations of cross section and period e¤ects. These combi-
nations are to account for the unobserved e¤ect within a panel and the idiosyncratic errors
in the model. Typically, assuming xed e¤ects within a panel estimation is equivalent to
imposing time independent e¤ects for each entity that are possibly correlated with the re-
gressors. On the other hand, the random e¤ects assumption is that the individual specic
e¤ects are uncorrelated with the regressors. We conduct a series of diagnostic tests for mis-
specication, the redundancy of the xed e¤ects, and the consistency of the random e¤ects
(where applicable). We present a summary of the estimated models and the main tests in
table 3 (in appendix)12.
In table 3, model 1 is estimated using simple OLS with no cross section and period
e¤ects. Models 2, 3 and 9 are estimated with the assumption of cross section xed e¤ects,
and models 4, 5 and 8 are estimated with the assumption of cross section random e¤ects.
Models 5, 7 and 9 are estimated assuming that period e¤ects are random, while models 3, 6
12 In table 4 and table 6 we present summary of some important individual diagnostic tests.
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and 8 are estimated assuming that they are xed. The RESET tests for each model suggest
misspecication in models 2, 4, 5, 8 and 10. The cross section xed e¤ects are found to be
individually signicant for models 2 and 9, while period xed e¤ects are found individually
signicant in models 6 and 8. For model 3 the cross section and period xed e¤ects are
found to be jointly as well as individually signicant. We nd inconsistent random cross
section e¤ects in model 4 and 8, but for model 9 we nd that the random period e¤ects are
consistent.
The wald test for the constant returns to scale in the production technology suggest that
for 7 out of 10 specications the CRTS assumption holds. We reject the CRTS assumption
for specications 1, 6, and 7. Summary of this test is in table 4. The coe¢ cient estimates are
generally statistically signicant. We nd signicant negative marginal product of labour in
specications 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10. As it appears from the estimations, the coe¢ cient esti-
mates for land and machinery are the largest and these estimates are statistcially signicant
for all specications except 2 and 4. Based on these estimates, we use (14) and the CRTS
assumption in order to pin down the values for the parameters (except a0) in the structural
production function (1) and the utility function parameter , and these computed values
(and other pinned down parameters) are reported in table 5. The reported value of a0 in
table 5 is derived in a later stage of the computations.
Based on the diagnostic tests, we choose two representative models, model 3 (one with
xed cross section and xed period e¤ects) and model 9 (one with xed cross section and
random period e¤ects). The test summary for model selection which is primarily based on
the signicance of the xed and random e¤ects is in table 6. For both model 3 and model
9 the RESET test suggest no misspecication, and for both models the adjusted R2 is very
high relative to the others (the Akaike Information Criterion for model 3 is the lowest). For
model 3 the cross section and period xed e¤ects are signicant, while for model 9 the cross
section xed e¤ects are signicant and the random period e¤ects are consistent13.
We use the estimated s of model 3 and model 9, the constant returns to scale assump-
tion, and (14) in order to pin down two sets of estimates for ai 2 [0; 1] ; i = 1; 2; 3; 4, and
. We then use these pinned down values, the index for inputs and output prices, and
(15) in order to simulate the time path of Ainc for the two models. The time path for A
is computed using standard growth accounting approach, where A is the standard Solow
residual equivalent. Using (17) we then simulate a path for Aother. We x  = 1 and use
(16) in order to compute a series of a0. In principle, the parameter a0 should not vary over
13We conduct a standard Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity and nd no heteroscedasticity for
models 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10. The wald test for the overall signicance of the estimation suggest that the
estimated parameters for all these models are jointly signicant.
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time but the method we use to identify its value in this computation results in a series for
this parameter. The computed value for this parameter is essential for computing a series
for the optimal e¤ort levels, which in turns will be used to compute a series of welfare levels.
As is clear from (8), (9) and (6), any variation in the optimal e¤ort levels and the level of
(optimum) welfare over time is due to variations in input use and variations in input and
output prices (and not a0). We therefore compute the simple arithmetic average of the
parameter a0 from the series we generate, which we hold as its pinned down value14. These
values are 1 for model 3 and 0:99 for model 9, both of which are reported in table 5.
These computations enable us to explore (8) and (9) in order to simulate the series of
optimal e¤ort levels "N and "

M . Finally, using the simulated optimal e¤ort levels, the pinned
down parameter values, and the index for input and output prices we simulate a time path
of the utility index (for both models). This enables us to examine the changes in welfare
due to policy reforms. Given the anaytical model, any policy reform that alters the prices
of inputs and output has two channels of a¤ecting the welfare level: the enhanced incentives
to earn higher prots (which adds to welfare), and the incentive to exert more e¤ort to earn
higher prots (which reduces welfare). Improvement in welfare due to a particular policy
reform thus will depend on which of these two e¤ects dominate. Intuitively, if the particular
reform brings in a relatively higher rate of increase in the price of output it will a¤ect both
the prots and the optimal e¤ort levels. Unless the net e¤ect is numerically characterized,
it is not possible to say if that reform will add anything to farmerswelfare.
5 Results and analysis
In gures 2a and 3a, we present the simulated path of A and the simulated path of Ainc
and the path of their growth rates, respectively, that are computed using the estimated
parameters for model 3. In gures 2b and 3b, we do the same for A and Ainc and their
growth rates using the estimated parameters for model 9.
As in gure 3a, it appears that the policy reforms of 1978, 1991 and 1998 have had
immediate e¤ects on the growth of the incentive component of TFP of wheat production in
China. This immediate e¤ect does not mimic the contemporaneous variation in the growth
in TFP, but there is evidence of a lagged correlation between the growth in these two series.
The incentive component of TFP generally attened out following the reform of 1984 and its
14We check for the sensitivity of our main ndings (related to the changes in welfare) for a set of plausible
values for , and nd that this parameter only has level e¤ects. We therefore present the key results for
 = 1.
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growth rate remained very low until the price reform of the early nineties. For both models
we nd a high growth in the incentive component following the introduction of the rural
reform (the introduction of the partly liberalized regime in 1978), after which its growth
rate continues to drop until the nineties. The eighties reforms (which were mainly based on
price subsidies) did little in improving the growth in the incentive component of TFP, and
during most of this regime TFP growth was negative. Following the introduction of grain
self-su¢ ciency regime (i.e. when the government took over the control over prices) growth
in the incentive component of TFP and growth in TFP both drastically fall.
These results suggest that wheat farmers in China in general respond to incentives that
are introduced through the policy reforms. Their response which we capture primarily in
the incentive component of TFP is an account of how they react to changes in policy and
institutions. Flat subsidies in the eighties did not generate enough incentives for farmers
which is why the incentive component of TFP su¤ered decline throughout most of the eight-
ies. Growth in the incentive component also su¤ers following the most recent major reform
in 1998. Overall the growth in this component is very minimal in the most recent regime,
indicating that with the introduction of the grain self-su¢ ciency regime the government has
destroyed the incentive-induced growth in TFP. This is also clear in the declining trend of
the TFP series, as in gures 2a and 2b.
Until 1997 the main channel of growth in TFP of wheat production in China was the
incentives that were introduced during the rst two regimes. This nding is similar to the
ndings in Lin (1992) and Harrold (1992) which examine the productivity growth during
the rst phase of rural reforms. Our simulations suggest that the growth in the incentive
component of TFP was reasonably high during 1993-1997. What apparently killed the
growth in the incentive component of the TFP is the governments decision to take over the
control on input and output prices, and even an increase in openness (when China joined
WTO in 2001) which imposed a higher demand for Chinese wheat failed to generate enough
incentives for wheat farmers.
We also nd very little growth in the incentive component of TFP during 1986-1991, a
period which is a part of the liberalized regime. This shows that the at subsidies which
were introduced in 1986 were rather ine¤ective in generating incentives to produce more.
The positive growth in the incentive component of TFP in the early nineties were mainly
due to the price reforms, which in turns imply that in China price reforms and liberalization
of agricultural markets in general are more e¤ective than at subsidies or state regulations
in generating incentives for farmers to produce more.
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5.1 Reforms and changes in welfare
The simulated welfare index and its growth for 1978-2007 are presented in gures 4 and 6.
The simulated optimal e¤ort levels for the same time period are in gures 5 and 7. The
welfare indices are simple computations of the utility as dened by (6) using the computed
prot index, pinned down parameter values (including  = 1) and the optimal e¤ort levels
for 1978-2007.
As it appears, wheat farmersoptimal e¤ort levels experienced a boost with the intro-
duction of the rural reforms in 1978 but eventually these levels attened out following the
introduction of the price subsidies in 1984. The price reforms of the early nineties resulted
in another spell of boost in optimal e¤ort levels. Prior to that the optimal e¤ort levels
remained static following the introduction of increased price subsidy, and the boost in the
early nineties suggest that farmers exert more e¤ort under a deregulated price structure.
Following the state controls on price which were established in 1998, optimal e¤ort levels
increase steadily until 2004 after which they faltten out again. The trends in optimal e¤ort
levels are similar for both model 3 and model 9.
With the introduction of the rural reforms in 1978 farmerswelfare level experiences
an immediate boost. But after that it remains more or less static until 1993. A series of
droughts in the early nineties adversely a¤ected agriculture in China, which is apparently
why despite the nineties price reforms and deregulation of markets the farmers prots
were not as expected resulting in a decline in welfare. With increased level of e¤ort, welfare
starts to drop sharply from the early nineties and continues to drop until 1996. Just prior
to the introduction of the price regulations the welfare has a sharp increase, but right after
the introduction of the most recent regulations farmerswelfare drops again. This reform
is followed by a temporary increase in welfare in 1999, after which it drops again.
Our computations show that until the two tier pricing reform was undertaken, farmers
welfare was more or less stable with its growth moving around a zero mean. This was the
period when the government introduced increased price subsidy (in 1984) and a scheme of
subsidies to cereal production (in 1986). This in turns imply that the introduction of at
subsidies during the eighties actually did very little in improving farmerswelfare, and the
farmers actually responded more when pricing reforms were introduced and markets were
further deregulated.
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5.2 Regional level growth in TFP and growth in its incentive component
We use standard Solow residual approach in order to compute the TFP and its growth
rate for the regional level for the period 1997-2006. Computation of the regional level Ainc
requires more information at the regional level. The SYB, CBNS does not report input
prices for the regional level, which is why we use available information and (5) in order
to compute a series of the term p (1  ) in (15) for each region over the period 1997-
2006. Only the SYB, CBNS 1997 reports per capita prots of agricultural households,
which is why we collect the information on per capita net income of rural population (in
yuan) from the peoples livelihood series in the SYB, CBNS. We hold this as a proxy for
per capita agricultural prots. We derive the per capita wheat output by dividing the
aggregate regional wheat output by the total agricultural labour force. A measure of the
term p (1  ) for the regional level is then derived using (5).
In order to verify this computation we collect information on the gross value of farming,
forestry, animal husbandry and shing output, which is in 100 million yuans for each region
over the period 1997-2006. This measure is a crude proxy for the term pQ, where Q
denotes aggregate regional output of all agricultural activity. We divide this number by the
agricultural labour force in order to derive a crude measure of the term pq in (5), i.e. a
measure of the per capita gross value of agricultural output. The ratio of the per capita
agricultural prots and the per capita gross value of agricultural output gives us the term
(1  ) for the regional level. We derive a measure of the price level at the regional level
by dividing the term pq by the per capita output of all agricultural activity (the total
agricultural output in 1000 tons is available from the Agriculture series in SYB, CBNS).
We use the computed price series and the series of computed (1  ) we generate a series
of p (1  ). This is a measure of this term at the total agricultural level, while the former
computation was for wheat production. We nd that these two series have similar trends
and there is a di¤erence in their levels. We use the rst computed series for simulating the
series of Ainc at the regional level.
The growth in regional level TFP and the growth in its incentive component for model
3 and model 9 are presented in gure 8 and gure 9 in appendix B. The simulations are
for the most recent reform period (the grain self-su¢ ciency regime), and for both models
the trends are similar. For all 30 regions in the sample there is literally no growth in the
incentive component. Although the growth in TFP is volatile, the rate is mostly in the
negative margins except for regions Anhui, Beijing and Yunnan. There is positive growth
in TFP in 2004 for 12 out of the 30 regions (e.g. Anhui, Beijing, Fujian, Inner Mongolia,
Gansu, Guangdong, Shanghai and some others). Some positive growth (on an average) in
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the incentive component of TFP can be observed in Chongqing, Fujian, Guangxi, Guizhou,
Hunan, Jiangxi, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Tibet and Xiangjin.
The regional level simulations justies the key ndings of this paper well. They show that
with the introduction of the price regulations, the government has destroyed the growth in
the incentive component of TFP at the regional level as well as the country-wide level. This
has resulted in an average negative growth of TFP, which in turns resulted in a continuous
decline in wheat production both at the regional level and the country-wide level.
6 Concluding Remarks
Many important studies which were undertaken before 1998 (e.g. Halbrendt and Gempesaw,
1990, Harrold, 1992 and Lin, 1992) report that the agricultural reforms in China that were
introduced until 1991 have performed their aim of generating rapid economic growth on
the basis of e¢ ciency gains. Harrold (1992) for instance nds that the subsidies introduced
in 1984 resulted in a 13.1% growth in gross output value and 6.8% growth in agricultural
output, which at the start of the rural reform were 10.7% and 6%, respectively. In the same
study Harrold (1992) reports that due to these reforms there was an overall increase in
welfare which in turns resulted in a decline in rural poverty levels. But China has su¤ered
a major decline in the annual growth rate of wheat production following the rst phase of
rural reforms. While the average growth rate of wheat production was 7.32% for the decade
1978-1987, the same for the decade 1988-1997 was only 2.08% (see Pingali and Heisey, 2001
for details). Allegedly, this low growth rate in wheat production motivated the government
to take back the control over agricultural prices.
In this study, we examine the most recent agricultural reforms in China at tandem with
the rst two phases of rural reforms. This enables us to clearly identify which reforms did
exactly what. Our results suggest that neither the rural reforms of 1978 nor the eighties
introduction of at subsidies generated enough incentives for farmers to increase e¤ort
in production. Neither of these reforms were associated with major changes in farmers
welfare. It was the price reforms of the early nineties (eventually leading the market towards
greater degree of liberalization) that provided enough incentives to exert more e¤ort towards
achieveing a higher level of productivity in wheat production. Higher e¤ort levels in this
period apparently resulted in a lower level of welfare because the resulting prots were not
high enough to o¤set the adverse e¤ect of e¤ort on farmersutility. This is where we nd
the importance of the role weather shocks (the series of droughts of the early nineties) and
the Asian nancial crisis played in reducing farmersprots. The positive impact of the
pricing reform was therefore overshadowed by random shocks to the economy.
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We nd some welfare improvement which immediately followed the re-introduction of
state control over agricultural prices. Overall the series of agricultural reforms introduced
in China in the nineties shows to have had the most important impact on wheat farmers
productivity and welfare. These ndings imply that the future agricultural reforms in
China need to focus on their potential impact on the welfare of farmers, something which
can be achieved through the introduction of a more deregulated market structure where
the government would have minimum control over the pricing of agricultural inputs and
output.
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Appendix A: Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics for regional level data (30 regions, 1997-2006)
Variable Description Mean St. Dev Min Max
Output Total yield of wheat (1000 tons) 1449.37 3260.82 0.030 17271.96
Labour Agricultural employment (10000 persons) 282.70 548.91 0.855 5193.69
Machinery Total power of agricultural machinery (10000 kw) 521.24 984.02 2.507 4854.93
Land Total area of land sown for wheat (10000 Hectares) 384.92 957.03 0.012 11771.28
Fertilizer Total quantity of chemical fertilizer (10000 tons) 39.28 68.32 0.270 332.26
Table 2: Summary statistics for national level data (time series, 1978-2007)
Variable Description Mean St. Dev Min Max
Output Total yield of wheat (1000 tons) 23774.16 5721.55 15602.55 33835.04
Labour Agricultural employment (millions) 0.30 0.06 0.20 0.42
Machinery Total power of agricultural machinery (10000 kw) 8851.06 2984.16 3450.05 14924.07
Land Total area of land sown for wheat (1000 Hectares) 7454.94 2032.04 3819.56 10012.99
Fertilizer Total quantity of chemical fertilizer (1000 tons) 8731.71 2617.05 3919.59 13830.86
Table 4: Summary of Wald test for CRTS hypothesis.
Model Test Critical value Critical value Decision
Statistic  = 0:05  = 0:01
1 8.788 3.876 6.731 Reject Null
2 3.780 3.876 6.731 Accept Null
3 3.797 3.877 6.734 Accept Null
4 0.183 3.873 6.721 Accept Null
5 2.036 3.873 6.721 Accept Null
6 7.122 3.874 6.722 Reject Null
7 6.912 3.874 6.719 Reject Null
8 2.357 3.874 6.724 Accept Null
9 1.506 3.876 6.731 Accept Null
10 1.881 3.877 6.734 Accept Null
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Null hypothesis is constant returns to scale, i.e. 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 1.
Table 5: Pinned down parameter values for model 3 and model 9.
Model a1 a2 a3 a4   a0
3 0.985 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.099 0.348 1.00
9 0.950 0.020 0.020 0.010 0.098 0.351 0.99
Table 6a: Summary of redundant xed e¤ects test.
Model Cross section FE* Period FE Cross section & Period FE
test statistic [p-value] test statistic [p-value] test statistic [p-value]
2 15.24 [0.000]
3 25.22 [0.000] 15.50 [0.000] 21.01 [0.000]
8 15.57 [0.000]
9 25.022 [0.000]
10 25.22 [0.000] 15.50 [0.000] 21.01 [0.000]
* FE denotes Fixed E¤ects.
Table 6b: Summary of correlated random e¤ects test.
Model Cross section RE* Period RE Cross section & Period RE
test statistic [p-value] test statistic [p-value] test statistic [p-value]
4 23.92 [0.000]
5 22.43 [0.000] 5.91 [0.206] 29.50 [0.000]
8 25.97 [0.000]
9 7.56 [0.109]
* RE denotes Random E¤ects.
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Appendix B: Figures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1a.1: Wheat production in 1000 tons, 1978-2007
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Figure 1a.2: Total Sown Area (in 1000 Hectares) of wheat, 1978-2007
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Figure 1a.3: Agricultural employment (in millions), 1978-2007
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Figure 1a.4: Chemical fertilizer in agriculture (in 10000 tons), 1978-2007
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 Figure 1a.5: Total power of agricultural machinery (in 10000 kw), 1978-2007 
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Figure 1b.1: Wheat price index, 1978-2007
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Figure 1b.2: Land rental index, 1978-2007
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Figure 1b.3: Wage index, 1978-2007
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Figure 1b.4: Fertilizer price index, 1978-2007
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Figure 1b.5: Machinery price index, 1978-2007
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Figure 1b.6: Profit index, 1978-2007
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Figure 4a: Welfare Index for Model 3
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Figure 4b: Welfare Growth for Model 3
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Figure 5a: Optimal effort level for N (Model 3)
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Figure 5b: Optimal effort level for M (Model 3)
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Figure 6a: Welfare Index for Model 9
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Figure 6b: Welfare growth for Model 9
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Figure 7a: Optimal effort level for N (Model 9)
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Figure 7b: Optimal effort level for M (Model 9)
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Figure 3b: Growth in TFP (A) and growth in the incentive component of TFP (Ainc) for Model 9
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Figure 3a: Growth in TFP (A) and growth in the incentive component of TFP (Ainc) for Model 3
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Figure 2a: TFP Index (A) and the incentive component of TFP (Ainc) for Model 3
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Figure 2b: TFP Index (A) and the incentive component of TFP (Ainc) for Model 9
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Figure 8: Regional level growth in TFP and growth in incentive component of TFP (1997-2006) for Model 3. 
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Figure 9: Regional level growth in TFP and growth in incentive component of TFP (1997-2006) for Model 9. 
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97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
GAINC9 GA9
Shandong
-.6
-.5
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
GAINC9 GA9
Shanghai
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
GAINC9 GA9
Shanxi
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
GAINC9 GA9
Sichuan
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
GAINC9 GA9
Tianjin
-.20
-.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
GAINC9 GA9
Tibet
-.25
-.20
-.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
GAINC9 GA9
Xinjiang
-1
0
1
2
3
4
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
GAINC9 GA9
Yunnan
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
GAINC9 GA9
Zhejiang
 
